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Abstract
Florida House Bill 221 was signed into law on May 9, 2017.1 With the enactment of the Bill,
Florida joins forty-six other states, and the District of Columbia, in enacting statewide legislation
to legalize and regulate transportation network companies (“TNC”), such as Uber and Lyft.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Florida House Bill 221 was signed into law on May 9, 2017.
1
  With 
the enactment of the Bill, Florida joins forty-six other states, and the District 
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of Columbia, in enacting statewide legislation to legalize and regulate 
transportation network companies (“TNC”), such as Uber and Lyft.2  The 
law will provide these companies with a uniform set of operating standards 
throughout the state.
3
  The new law contains provisions addressing key 
policy arguments, which include the classification of TNC drivers, insurance 
requirements, background check requirements, administrative and reporting 
requirements, and the regulatory authority under the new regulatory scheme.
4
  
The law, which preempts all local regulations enacted before the law’s 
effective date and puts TNCs exclusively under state regulation going 
forward, carves out a small, but significant, exception allowing the operating 
authorities of airports and seaports to retain control over setting pickup fees 
and logistics within such locations.
5
 
This Comment will provide an overview of Florida’s TNC law and 
the current landscape of TNC regulations in Florida’s airports.6  Part II will 
provide background on the local regulatory landscape before the arrival of 
the state’s law and will give a brief background on statewide laws in the 
United States.
7
  Part III will provide a brief overview on key policy issues in 
Florida law.
8
  Part IV will analyze the operation and the impact of TNCs at 
airports.
9
  Part V will discuss potential gaps in Florida’s law.10  Lastly, Part 
VI will present a conclusion.
11
 
                                                                                                                             
1. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified 
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748). 
2. GINGER GOODIN & MAARIT MORAN, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 
COMPANIES 1 (2016), http://policy.tti.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TTI-PRC-TNCs-
SBC-031417.pdf; Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, TEXAS A&M 
TRANSP. INST., http://www.tti.tamu.edu/policy/technology/tnc-legislation/ (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017). 
3. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws. 
4. See id. § 1(7)–(11). 
5. See id. § 1(15)(a)–(b). 
6. See infra Parts II–VI. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra Part V. 
11. See infra Part VI. 
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II. THE ARRIVAL OF FLORIDA’S TNC LAW 
A. Background:  The Road to State Law 
The regulation of TNCs has been a hotly contested subject, not only 
in Florida, but also throughout the United States and the world.
12
  The arrival 
of TNCs in Florida created a political storm for local politicians and 
regulators.
13
  Uber, the largest of the TNCs, and its close rival, Lyft, arrived 
first in Miami, Florida around 2014.
14
  When they arrived, there were no 
transportation or for-hire regulations that fit the operating model of TNCs.
15
  
For-hire regulations, those applicable to taxicabs, appeared to be the closest 
fit, and thus were applied.
16
  However, TNCs did not conform to these 
regulations and continued to operate illegally.
17
  In willfully choosing to not 
abide by for-hire regulations, the TNCs gained a competitive advantage over 
                                                     
12. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Brian O’Keefe & Marty Jones, 
Uber’s Tax Shell Game, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 2015, at 115, 117. 
13. See Editorial, What Tallahassee Should Do on Uber, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), 
Jan. 29, 2016, at 18A; Douglas Hanks, In Email Blitz, Uber Threatens to Pull Out of Miami-
Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 14, 2016, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54698295.html. 
14. Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Chairman Backs Off in Uber Fight, But 
Sticking Points Remain, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:46 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54953260.html; Brian 
Solomon, Lyft Rides Tripled Last Year, but Remains Far Behind Uber, FORBES: TECH (Jan. 5, 
2017, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2017/01/05/lyft-rides-tripled-last-
year-but-remains-far-behind-uber/.  Because both Lyft and Uber are privately held companies, 
there is limited information on their financials and operations: 
Lyft remains a distant second place to Uber.  In the month of December, Uber 
completed 78 million rides in the U.S. compared with Lyft’s 18.7 million.  That 
means Uber is more than four times bigger than Lyft in each company’s home 
market.  Abroad, Uber has tens of millions of more rides.  FORBES estimates Uber 
completed more rides globally in the first two months of 2016 than Lyft did all 
year. 
Solomon, supra; see also Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft Are Getting Pushback from 
Municipalities All over the US, CNBC: TECH (Sept. 2, 2016, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-municipalities-all-
over-the-us.html. 
15. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade 
Looks to Other Cities in Struggle to Deal with Lyft, Uber, MIAMI HERALD (June 21, 2014, 6:16 
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1967467.html.  
Lyft’s director of government relations stated that local regulations did not address the 
business model of TNCs.  Mazzei, supra. 
16. See Mazzei, supra note 15.  “Miami-Dade has treated the companies as 
unlicensed taxi services — and [it is] hardly the only government to do so.”  Id. 
17. See Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed-It’s Time for Regulators to 
Shut It Down, HARV. BUS. REV.: BUS. L. (June 21, 2017), http://www.hbr.org/2017/06/uber-
cant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regulators-to-shut-it-down; Mazzei, supra note 15. 
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the local for-hire transportation industry, in part, through the cost-savings 
derived from their non-compliance with regulatory costs.
18
  The 
management-led rebellion against the application of local regulations to TNC 
drivers, promoted by the payment of fines for drivers, appeared to be the pre-
determined and highly criticized strategy behind the entry to all new 
markets.
19
  Pushing local regulations aside, TNCs aimed to hook their users 
with low fares and better service.
20
  Once hooked, TNCs would supplement 
their regulatory crusade by mobilizing their loyal user to demand regulatory 
change from lawmakers.
21
  Grassroots lobbying was effective and led to the 
creation of local TNC regulations; these regulations allowed TNCs to operate 
legally, if they met the requirements.
22
 
The enactment of local ordinances was not widespread and some 
Florida counties refused to provide TNCs a pathway to operate legally.
23
  
Even within the municipalities that enacted local TNC regulations, the 
regulations varied significantly; in 2016, state legislators sought to put an 
end to the chaos by suggesting the first proposals for the statewide regulation 
of TNCs
24
.  However, the Senate struck it down after the bill passed the 
House.
25
  Undeterred, and with a new pro-TNC Senate President, the Florida 
Legislature was able to pass House Bill 221 and bring the TNC regulatory 
landscape to its current form.
26
  The Bill was signed into law on May 9, 
2017.
27
 
                                                     
18. See Edelman, supra note 17. 
19. See id. (speaking on Uber’s fight against regulators); Patricia Mazzei, 
Miami-Dade Escalates Penalties Against Renegade Lyft Drivers, MIAMI HERALD (June 6, 
2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article1965588.html; Alyson Shontell, Cops in Miami Are Running a Sting to Catch Lyft 
Drivers, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/miami-
cops-are-running-a-sting-to-catch-lyft-drivers-2014-6. 
20. See Hanks, supra note 14. 
21. See id. 
22. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Miadeco Corp. v. 
Miami-Dade Cty., No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017).  “In response to lobbying and 
changes in the for-hire transportation market, the County exercised its legislative prerogative 
to create a separate system of regulations for TNEs.”  Id. 
23. See Michael Auslen et al., It’s Up to Rick Scott Now:  Should Local 
Governments Be Allowed to Regulate Uber?, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article145556644.html. 
24. See Michael Auslen, Uber Bill Easily Clears First Hurdle, BRADENTON 
HERALD: ST. POL. (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:26 PM), http://www.bradenton.com/news/politics-
government/state-politics/article131538319.html. 
 
25. Id. 
 
26. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified 
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); see also Daniel Ducassi, Brandes:  ‘This Is the Year for Ride-
Sharing in Florida’, POLITICO: FLA. (Jan. 11, 2017, 4:38 PM), 
4
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B. Florida Joins the Ninety Percent 
In 2013, the California Public Utilities Commission used its 
authority to legalize TNCs statewide “and define[d] the term transportation 
network company,” now commonly used to define ride-sharing companies 
such as Uber and Lyft.
28
  Soon after, in 2014, Colorado became the first state 
to enact state-level legislation authorizing and regulating TNCs.
29
  Statewide 
TNC legislation grew from thirty-three in May 2016 to forty-three in March 
2017.
30
  As of October 2017, forty-eight states, and the District of Columbia, 
have enacted some level of TNC legislation.
31
  The lonely hold-out states are 
Oregon and Vermont.
32
  No two TNC state laws are the same; some laws 
have similar or equivalent provisions while others differ, but the key policies 
in all legislative efforts involve the level of regulation, power of local 
authorities, the taxicab industry, and public safety.
33
  State lawmakers faced a 
challenging task in writing a comprehensive law that did not overly interfere 
with a free-market economy.
34
 
Florida’s TNC law established a uniform set of regulations for TNCs 
across the state.
35
  The key policies addressed in the law include the 
classification of TNC drivers as independent contractors and minimum 
insurance requirements.
36
  Notably, the law does not require TNCs or TNC 
drivers to obtain an initial or annual permit fee before beginning to operate; 
lawmakers only mandated a bi-annual submission of a compliance report 
prepared by an independent auditor.
37
  In addition, the law expressly 
preempts all existing and future local law, with the exception of airports and 
seaports, which have the authority to set reasonable pickup fees.
38
 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/01/brandes-this-is-the-year-for-ride-sharing-
in-florida-108663. 
27. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
28. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
29. Id. at 9. 
30. See id. at 1, 5. 
31. Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, supra note 2. 
32. See id. 
33. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 6–8. 
34. See Editorial, supra note 13. 
35. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
36. Id. § 1(9)(c)–(d); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9. 
37. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 9. 
38. Id. § 1(15)(a)–(b). 
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III. FLORIDA’S TNC LAW 
A. TNC Drivers as Independent Contractors 
Uber has vehemently stressed that it is a technology company, not a 
transportation provider, and Florida lawmakers agree.
39
  The ramifications, 
both legal and financial, between the classification of independent contractor 
and employee for the TNCs are tremendous.
40
  Under Florida’s TNC law, 
TNC drivers are classified as independent contractors, if the following four 
conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during 
which the TNC driver must be logged on to the TNC’s digital 
network. 
(b) The TNC does not prohibit the TNC driver from using digital 
networks from other TNCs. 
(c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from engaging in 
any other occupation or business. 
(d) The TNC and TNC driver agree in writing that the TNC driver 
is an independent contractor with respect to the TNC.
41
 
 
Two parts of the test, sub-subsections (a) and (c), share TNC’s 
marketing efforts towards drivers:  the liberty to decide when to drive and to 
do so as a supplemental income.
42
  Furthermore, providing a source of 
supplemental income for constituents was one of the purposes behind 
enacting the law, enabling TNCs to operate under a set of uniform 
regulations.
43
  Moreover, the liberty of TNC drivers to schedule their driving 
                                                     
39. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(1)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 2; 
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 3:2; Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring 
Controversy, NEWS-PRESS (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.news-
press.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bringcontroversy/15421511/. 
40. See ZACH SCHILLER & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, 
TAXES AND THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 1, 7 (2017), http://www.itep.org/wp-
content/uploads/ondemandeconomytaxes0317.pdf; GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9. 
41. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 7–
8. 
42. Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 39; Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare 
Legislation with Overwhelming Support, FLA. TREND (Apr. 19, 2017), 
http://www.floridatrend.com/article/21980/florida-house-senate-pass-rideshare-legislation-
with-overwhelming-support. 
43. See Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare Legislation with 
Overwhelming Support, supra note 42; Hogan, supra note 39. 
6
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times, as required by the statute, is in line with Florida case law previous to 
the passing of law.
44
 
Sub-subsection (b) of the test touches the highly competitive nature 
of TNCs.
45
  TNC rivals, Uber and Lyft, have always looked to gain a 
competitive advantage over the other, though the rivalry reached new heights 
when it was alleged that the TNCs participated in potentially illicit 
recruitment practices.
46
  It is unknown whether these practices, or similar 
ones, remain in effect or, if they are, whether courts would find them to be in 
violation of the statute.
47
 
The last sub-subsection, (d), was expressly addressed in McGillis v. 
Department of Economic Opportunity,
48
 where the court affirmed the 
decision of Florida’s Department of Economic Opportunity that a former 
Uber driver was not an employee for purposes of reemployment assistance 
“[b]ecause the parties’ contract explicitly provides that an Uber driver is not 
an employee and the nature of the parties’ relationship was consistent with 
this classification.”49  Similar agreements between Uber and its drivers have 
been upheld by courts to compel arbitration.
50
  As of now, no court has ruled 
TNC drivers as employees, though the issue is being litigated in federal 
courts.
51
  It appears TNC drivers will be categorized as independent-
contractors under Florida’s TNC law, although any change in case law or 
                                                     
44. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 7; 
McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017); 
Hogan, supra note 39. 
45. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 
7–8; Maya Kosoff, Uber Used a Secret Program Called “Hell” to Track Rival Drivers, 
VANITY FAIR (Apr. 13, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/uber-used-
a-secret-program-called-hell-to-track-rival-drivers. 
46. See Kosoff, supra note 45. 
47. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 
7–8; McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222.  It is unknown whether a Florida court, which held that an 
Uber driver was not an employee, before the enactment of Florida’s TNC statute, considered 
the sabotage allegations against Uber and Lyft.  McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222.  “Drivers are free 
to switch between using Uber’s driver application and the application of a competitor, such as 
Lyft.”  Id.; Kossoff, supra note 45; Casey Newton, This Is Uber’s Playbook for Sabotaging 
Lyft, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/26/6067663/this-is-
ubers-playbook-for-sabotaging-lyft (detailing Uber’s Operation SLOG). 
48. 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
49. Id.; see also Fla. CS for HB 221, § 1(9)(d). 
50. See Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-13263, 2017 WL 2197812, at *1 
(11th Cir. Ct. App. May 18, 2017) (per curiam); Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-
23267, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017). 
51. Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 
1418 (2016). 
7
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federal law could retroactively entitle a TNC driver to rights under state and 
federal employment statutes.
52
 
B. Minimum Insurance Requirements 
When it came to regulating TNCs, TNCs and insurance were 
inseparable.
53
  The new law clearly details insurance requirements and both 
operational and legal clarifications for insurers.
54
  The clarification provides 
relief to TNC drivers and insurers.
55
  In the past, insurance issues included 
coverage gaps and amounts, and the absence of a regulatory framework led 
drivers to commit fraud by omitting information from insurers.
56
  The law 
aims to combat omissions to insurers by mandating that a TNC driver, or the 
TNC on behalf of the driver, carry insurance which “[r]ecognizes that the 
TNC driver is a TNC driver or otherwise uses a vehicle to transport riders for 
compensation.”57  Moreover, the insurance requirement provision of the law 
adopts a similar classification of TNC activity to that of the one provided as 
guidance by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) 
and mirrors that of other states’ TNC laws.58  The classification of each 
activity period corresponds to distinct insurance requirements.
59
  Florida’s 
law establishes the minimum insurance amounts to be maintained during two 
distinct TNC activity periods:  (1) when “a participating TNC driver is 
logged on to the digital network but is not engaged in a prearranged ride” 
and (2) when a “TNC driver is engaged in a prearranged ride.”60  The 
insurance maintained by either the TNC, the TNC driver, or a combination of 
both can satisfy the requirements.
61
 
                                                     
52. McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 221, 225–26; see also SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra 
note 40, at 4, 7. 
53. See Editorial, supra note 13. 
54. See Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(8)(b)(f), 2017 
Fla. Laws 4–6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); Ellen Huet, Rideshare Drivers Still 
Cornered into Insurance Secrecy, FORBES: TECH (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/18/uber-lyft-driver-insurance/. 
55. See Ducassi, supra note 26. 
56. See Huet, supra note 54. 
57. Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(a)(1), 2017 Fla. Laws 4; 
see also Huet, supra note 54. 
58. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
59. Id. 
60. Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(2), 2017 Fla. Laws 
4. 
61. Id. § 1(7)(c)(2)(a)–(c). 
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C. Reporting Requirements 
Florida’s TNC law does not require TNCs to receive approval of 
new law.
62
  The only administrative regulatory compliance required of TNCs 
is the submission of “an examination report prepared by an independent 
certified public accountant for the sole purpose of verifying that the TNC has 
maintained compliance with” two provisions of the law for the preceding two 
years of operation, to the Department of Financial Services.
63
  The first 
provision covers insurance disclosures, and the second, exclusions and TNC 
driver requirements.
64
  If the report discloses that the TNC is found to have 
been non-compliant during the examination period, the TNC will be fined 
$10,000.
65
  In the case of non-compliance, another report due the following 
January, is required.
66
  A $20,000 fine is imposed for non-compliance 
discovered in the additional report.
67
 
D. Pay to Operate:  Fees and Tailor-Made Taxes 
1. The Regulatory Cost to Operate for TNCs 
The costs and administrative requirements necessary to begin 
operating legally under enacted state TNC laws vary, as does the regulatory 
authority assigned to oversee permitting.
68
  Typically, before a permit to 
operate is granted, the TNC must submit to the relevant authority “proof of 
compliance with requirements outlined in the legislation, such as insurance 
or driver information requirements.”69  In addition, some states require TNCs 
to pay a fee as part of the initial application process.
70
  The fee is referred to, 
                                                     
62. See id. § 1(2).  TNCs do not have to submit the examination report 
required by law until January 1, 2019.  Id. § 1(11)(e). 
63. Id. 
64. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(8), (11), 2017 Fla. Laws 
6, 8. 
65. Id. § 1(11)(f). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280.3 (2017) ($5000 application fee plus 
an annual permit fee of $5000), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-606 (2016) (annual permit 
fee of $111,250).  Examples of regulatory authorities under TNC state laws include:  Virginia 
and West Virginia use the Department of Motor Vehicles; Arizona, Delaware, and South 
Carolina use the Department of Transportation; California and Ohio use the Public Utilities 
Commission; Nevada used the Transportation Authority.  GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 
8. 
69. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2 at 8. 
70. See id. 
9
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generally, as a license or permit fee.
71
  Annual fees range from $500 in 
Montana to $111,250 in Colorado.
72
  Though Colorado’s flat annual fee is 
currently the highest, and may be adjusted to cover the direct and indirect 
costs associated with implementing the TNC law, the formulation of annual 
permit fees prescribed by some states may surpass that figure.
73
  That is 
because “[i]n some states the permit fees are proportional to the size or 
extent of a TNC operation.”74  For example, Georgia, Michigan, and 
Kentucky base their annual fee on a tier-system categorized by the number of 
cars operating under the TNC.
75
  Of these, Georgia’s master license fee is the 
most expensive of the three states, costing $300,000 to register 1001 cars or 
more, which is ten times more expensive than the cost to register the same 
amount of cars in Michigan, and over thirteen times more expensive than 
Kentucky.
76
 
2. Custom Made TNC Taxes 
With only eight states currently applying sales or a gross receipt tax 
on taxi fares, TNCs do not have an overwhelming exposure to such tax.
77
  As 
such, some states have taken the initiative to design TNC specific taxes to go 
along with TNC laws.
78
  Nevada and South Carolina levy, on TNCs, an 
assessment fee based on their gross revenue.
79
  South Carolina has set the fee 
at 1% of gross trips, while Nevada has set the amount at 3%.
80
  Some states 
and cities have imposed a per-ride fee or a variation thereof on TNCs.
81
  
                                                     
71. Id. (license in Georgia and permit in Colorado). 
72. Id. 
73. See id.  If a TNC had over 1000 cars in Georgia, the annual license fee 
would cost $300,000, surpassing Colorado’s flat annual fee of $111,250.  GOODIN & MORAN, 
supra note 2, at 8. 
74. Id. 
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) (2016); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 § 
2(4)(c) (2017); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) ($30,000 for more than 1000 
vehicles); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 § 2(4)(c) ($22,500 for 501 or more vehicles); GOODIN 
& MORAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
77. See SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 3. 
78. Id. at 4. 
79. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 
40, at 4. 
80. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER& DAVIS, supra note 
40, at 4–5. 
81. SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 4–5.  Massachusetts imposes a 
twenty-cent per-ride fee, while Pennsylvania imposes a 1.4% gross receipt tax only on rides 
that originate in Philadelphia; Seattle, which has not been preempted by state law, imposes a 
similar fee at twenty-four cents per-ride.  See id.; Transportation Network Companies, 
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These variable annual fee structures tie fee amounts to the growth and 
success of TNCs, thus if the exponential growth of TNCs continues, so will 
the fee revenue of these states.
82
  The regulatory enforcement of TNCs 
comes at a cost, hence, states use the fees collected to help cover those 
costs.
83
  In states where annual fees could become significant and surpass 
enforcement costs, fee funds are distributed back to municipalities in 
proportion to population or TNC trip origination.
84
  Aside from 
administrative and operational enforcement, TNC fees can be applied in 
ways that promote the public welfare.
85
  Seattle has mandated, in addition to 
a fourteen-cent share on all TNC rides originating in the city, that TNCs pay 
ten cents per-ride for the Wheelchair Accessible Services Fund.
86
 
IV. AIRPORTS & TNCS:  A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP 
A. Background:  Airports and Revenue 
Local governments, generally, are concerned only with activities that 
are in the best interest of the people they represent.
87
  One such interest is the 
establishment, operation, and management of a public airport.
88
  The 
government units, which own and operate public airports across the United 
States, vary, but they are essentially cities or counties.
89
  A popular form of 
airport governance has been the creation of subunits of local governments, 
commonly known as airport authorities.
90
  The authority may also possess 
the power to raise funds by taxation or the issuance of bonds, if expressly 
provided by the statute creating the airport authority.
91
  Airport authorities 
are given wide latitude on their management of day-to-day operations, 
                                                                                                                             
SEATTLE.GOV: BUS. REG., http://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-
tncs/transportation-network-companies/tnc-companies (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
82. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SOLOMON, supra note 14. 
83. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
257.2104(3)–(4) (2017). 
84. See e.g., GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8 (South Carolina distributes 
surplus TNC funds to municipalities in proportion to trip origination). 
85. See e.g., SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 5 (local government 
imposed per-ride fee to be used on local transportation projects and transportation for the 
disabled). 
86. Transportation Network Companies, supra note 81. 
87. See e.g., Hunter Bacot & Jack Christine, What’s So “Special” About 
Airport Authorities?  Assessing the Administrative Structure of U.S. Airports, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 241, 241 (2006). 
88. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, Westlaw (database updated May 2017). 
89. Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241. 
90. Id. at 242. 
91. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, supra note 88. 
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though “the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has significant 
input into airport operations through regulatory direction.”92  To receive 
federal funding, airports must comply with assurances tied to the grants.
93
  In 
the case of FAA grants, the airport must “maintain a schedule of charges for 
use of facilities and services at the airport[] that will make the airport as 
self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at the airport, 
including volume of traffic and economy of collection.”94  In light of all the 
applicable restrictions, airport operators have become cost-effective and have 
looked to increase non-aeronautical revenue.
95
 
Almost all airports in the United States receive federal funding, but 
the majority of “their operational revenue come[s] . . . from rents and fees 
paid by . . . aeronautical and non-aeronautical” entities.96  As operators, 
airport authorities have the power to impose fees and other operational 
directives on commercial businesses operating within the airport facilities.
97
  
Airports receive revenue from two general groups of users:  aeronautical 
users, which are commercial airlines, and non-aeronautical users.
98
  Non-
aeronautical businesses include car rental companies, parking lots, 
restaurants, gift shops, and ground transportation services.
99
 
Non-aeronautical revenue is not regulated as aeronautical revenue, 
coming from commercial airlines, is regulated.
100
  “[F]ees charged to non-
aeronautical users are not subject to the [FAA] reasonableness requirement 
or the Department of Transportation Policy on airport rates and charges . . . 
.”101  The FAA has limited its input regarding non-aeronautical revenues to 
interpreting the self-sustaining requirement to mandate that airports charge 
non-aeronautical users fair market value for the use of the airport’s 
facilities.
102
  The flexibility and ability of airlines to challenge fees can serve 
as a deterrent to airports overcharging since an airport’s non-compliance 
with the reasonable fee assurance can result in a breach of the contractual 
                                                     
92. Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241. 
93. Id. 
94. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13)–(A) (2012). 
95. Maria Z. Nucci, Allocation of Economic Risk in Nonaeronautical Airport 
Revenue Contracts, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2002, at 6. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. at 7. 
98. Id. at 6. 
99. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 
367, 369 (11th Cir. 1987); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241. 
100. See Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 
Fed. Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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grant.
103
  Unlike airlines, non-aeronautical businesses do not have the same 
recourses available to challenge airport fees, which has resulted in 
litigation.
104
  Courts have given airport regulations great deference, holding 
them to be constitutional so long as the authority promulgating them can 
point the regulation to being rationally related to a legitimate objective.
105
 
B. The Arrival of TNCs at Airports 
The growth of TNCs, such as Uber and Lyft, has been exponential, 
reportedly gathering up “as much as one-fourth of the U.S. ride-hailing 
market.”106  One customer segment TNCs have been aggressively pursuing 
has been business travelers, successfully beating out taxis in the competition 
for the profitable customer segment.
107
  A component behind the success of 
TNCs in capturing the business traveler segment has been their slow, but 
persistent, entry into airports.
108
  Airports represent lucrative opportunities 
for TNCs, but airports have been reluctant in opening their doors to TNCs.
109
  
Though it is not a one-way street, airports also look at TNC fees as a 
potential significant revenue stream.
110
  TNC fees provide a new revenue 
stream for airports, but it is not always at a net increase to the airport’s 
overall revenue.
111
  More passengers taking TNCs to the airport translates 
into fewer parking, taxicab, and car rental fees for airports.
112
  These fees are 
major components of an airport’s non-aeronautical revenue; “[l]ast year, the 
                                                     
103. See id. at 7720, 7723. 
104. See Alamo, 825 F.2d at 370. 
105. See id. at 373–74; Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan 
Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1984). 
106. SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 10. 
107. Kerry Close, Why You Can’t Take an Uber Home from the Airport, TIME: 
MONEY (July 7, 2016), http://www.time.com/money/4396248/uber-lyft-ban-airport/. 
108. See Jenni Bergal, Airport Parking Takes Hit from Uber, Lyft, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (July 18, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/07/18/airport-parking-takes-hit-from-uber-lyft.  In the United 
States, “Lyft has agreements with nearly 240 airports and Uber has agreements with more than 
a hundred.”  Id. 
109. Close, supra note 107.  Airports represent a key portion of the travel 
market that TNCs are aggressively pursuing, in part, by focusing on business travelers because 
11% of them use TNCs.  Id. 
110. See Andrea Ahles, DFW Won’t Raise Parking Rates Again, and You Can 
Thank Uber and Lyft, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (June 29, 2017, 10:57 AM), 
http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/sky-talk-blog/article158814344.html 
(explaining that revenue from TNC fees will have nearly doubled in three years). 
111. Bergal, supra note 108. 
112. Id. 
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$3.5 billion in fees represented 41[%] of the $8.5 billion in U.S. airport 
revenue not related to airlines.”113 
Parking related fees have been a large revenue stream for airports for 
many years, and now make up nearly 20% of non-aeronautical revenue for 
airports in the United States.
114
  In some cases, car rental fees provide an 
even larger revenue stream for airports.
115
  For example, at Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport (“FLL”), revenue from car rental fees is 
“the largest source of revenue[],” making up about 30% of the airport’s total 
operating revenue.
116
  Likewise, parking fees also provide a significant 
revenue stream for airports, “typically represent[ing] between one-fifth and 
one-quarter of that revenue category.”117  The impact of TNCs on airport 
revenues has not been fully determined because TNCs have only been 
operating under formal agreements with airports for a short period of time.
118
  
Nonetheless, the current reduction in fees, whether short or long term, have 
airport operators looking to offset the losses with TNC fees.
119
  In addition, 
as airport operators, authorities must ensure that TNCs are abiding by the 
regulations of the airport, not only for economic reasons, but also for safety, 
security, and general operational matters.
120
  The enforcement of TNCs 
requires “increased staffing costs to oversee ride-hailing operations and 
increased curbside congestion, mean[ing] less money for the airport and 
other public transportation services that airport revenue subsidizes.”121 
Maintaining certain revenue levels for airports is also of critical 
importance to maintaining operations, covering debt-servicing, and fulfilling 
certain federal grant assurances.
122
  The reductions in revenue seen from 
increases in the use of TNCs have not yet proved to be a financial risk for 
airports, in part, because airports are subsidizing the reductions with fees 
charged to TNCs.
123
  For example, the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport faced a 
                                                     
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE 
YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 AND 2015 13 (2017), 
http://www.broward.org/Airport/About/Documents/Fssigned03272017.pdf. 
116. Id. 
117. Bergal, supra note 108. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 
367, 371 n.4 (11th Cir. 1987). 
121. Sandra Tan, NFTA Fears $2 Million in Lost Airport Revenue Because of 
Uber, Lyft, BUFF. NEWS (July 6, 2017), http://www.buffalonews.com/2017/07/06/nfta-fears-2-
million-airport-revenue-loss-due-uber-lyft-services/. 
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 47107(b) (2012); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 
371 n.4. 
123. See Bergal, supra note 108. 
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shortfall in parking fee projections, but will not raise parking rates for the 
first time in five years thanks to the increase in the airport’s ground 
transportation revenue, which has benefitted from TNC fees.
124
  For airport 
authorities looking at the long term coexistence of the economic demands of 
their airports and TNC fees, it is “appropriate for the [a]uthority to factor in 
future development plans when setting user fees.”125  The relationship 
between ground transportation revenue and capital expenditures does not 
have to be perfectly aligned since one revenue stream can be used to 
complement or subsidize other unrelated revenue streams, like fees charged 
to airlines.
126
  In subsidizing airline fees, the airport becomes more attractive 
to airlines.
127
  For instance, at FLL in Florida: 
Non-airline revenues, represented 71.1% of total 
operating revenues in fiscal year 2016.  The main categories of 
non-airline revenues, rental car revenues, parking revenues, and 
concessions, have steadily been increasing over the last few years, 
due to increases in passenger activity and also increases in sales 
per passenger.  This increase in non-airline revenues has 
contributed to the ability to maintain low terminal rents and 
landing fees that result in a low CPE [Cost Per Enplanement].  
This low-cost structure makes the Airport attractive to air carriers, 
especially low-cost carriers.
128
 
Where state laws have not preempted local authorities from setting 
TNC airport fees, many airports have reached agreements with the TNCs.
129
  
The agreements vary in structure, such as a flat fee or a per-ride fee, and in 
amounts.
130
  The agreements are products of often tense and lengthy 
negotiations between policymakers and the TNCs.
131
  Airport authorities 
bargain for an agreement that considers the effect of TNCs on the airport, 
which includes lost revenue from reduced ground transportation, parking, 
                                                     
124. Ahles, supra note 110. 
125. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 906 F.2d 516, 
522 (11th Cir. 1990); Bergal, supra note 108. 
126. BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, supra note 115, at 12. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. 
129. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14; e.g., Bergal, supra note 108 
(Buffalo Niagara International Airport in New York will charge Lyft a three-dollar fee per-
ride and Uber a flat fee of $180,000); Taylor, supra note 14 (Newark Airport signed a $10 
million dollar deal with Uber). 
130. See Bergal, supra note 108.  Lyft is charged on a per-ride basis, while 
Uber is charged a flat fee, both agreements were for one year.  Id. 
131. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
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and car rental fees, as well as enforcement costs.
132
  TNCs look for a fee 
structure that best reflects its operation at that airport and, ultimately, as for-
profit entities with shareholders, looking for the lowest cost possible.
133
 
C. Landscape of TNC Laws at Airports 
Broad preemption language eliminating or limiting the authority of 
local governments to regulate TNCs is not uncommon in enacted state 
laws.
134
  However, a significant amount of states carve out exceptions to the 
preemption for airport and seaport authorities.
135
  Only a small number of 
states have left their state’s airport operator without any authority to impose 
on TNCs fees or other operational directives.
136
  Within those states, the 
authority left to airport authorities varies.
137
  The majority of those states 
allow the airport to set pickup fees and operational directives.
138
  In some 
instances, states provide parameters under which airport authorities must 
abide by when setting TNC fees.
139
 
                                                     
132. See Bergal, supra note 108.  “[O]fficials estimate they could lose more 
than $2 million in revenue a year from parking, taxi, and car rental fees because of TNCs . . . 
.”  Id. 
133. See Eric Anderson, Uber Balks at Airport Process, TIMES UNION (N.Y.), 
July 12, 2017, at A1. 
134. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14. 
135. Id. at 7, 14. 
136. Id. at 7.  Of the states that have left no authority to airport authorities 
under respective TNC laws, Colorado is the only state home to a major airport, Denver 
International Airport.  See id. at 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CALENDAR YEAR 2016 
PRELIMINARY REVENUE ENPLANEMENTS AT COMMERCIAL AIRPORTS 1 (2017), 
http://www.FAA.gov/Airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/p
reliminary-cy-16-commercial-service-enplanements.pdf 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170715205149/https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacit
y/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/preliminary-cy16-commercial-service-
enplanements.pdf]. 
137. Compare Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. 
Laws 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748(15)(b)) (authority to set pickup fees that must be 
consistent with those charged to taxicabs), with GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191 (2016). 
138. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–14. 
139. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191.  One such state is Georgia, home to the 
busiest airport in the world.  FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1.  Georgia limits the 
fees charged to TNCs—ride share network services—and taxi services alike, to “not exceed 
airport’s approximate cost” of regulating the operation of the entities at the airport.  GA. CODE 
ANN. § 40-1-191. 
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D. Florida’s Airports & TNCs 
1. Florida’s Valuable Airport Opportunity 
Florida recently moved ahead of Texas to the number two spot for 
“overall number of passengers boarding airplanes” in the nation.140  Since 
Uber’s arrival in Miami, the company’s share of the business travelers 
segment increased from 17% to 67% in just two years.
141
  As an important 
and profitable client base for TNCs, the positive trend underlies the 
importance of TNCs gaining access to Florida’s airports.142  Florida is home 
to four large hub airports—airports that represent at least 1% of total 
enplanements in the United States.
143
  All four airports are within the top 
thirty airports, according to total passenger enplanements 2016.
144
  Since 
Miami-Dade—Florida’s most populous county—legalized TNCs in May 
2016, the $2 pickup fee imposed on Uber by MIA has translated into over $2 
million in revenue for the airport in one year.
145
 
2. Airport Authorities Under Florida’s TNC Law 
Florida is divided by law into sixty-seven political subdivisions 
called counties.
146
  As in the rest of the United States, subunits of local 
governments have been created by law to operate airports in Florida.
147
  
Florida’s airport authorities, through the power derived from their 
Legislature, “have the right, power, and authority to enter into contracts with 
one or more motor carriers for the transportation of passengers for hire 
                                                     
140. Jim Turner, Florida Passes Texas in Airport Traffic in 2016, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Fla.), July 18, 2017, at 8A. 
141. Douglas Hanks, Miami Business Travelers Abandon Taxis for Uber, 
MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), Feb. 1, 2017, at 8A. 
142. See Close, supra note 107. 
143. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1.  Florida’s Large Hub 
Airports listed by total enplanements in 2016:  Miami International Airport (“MIA”), Orlando 
International Airport (“MCO”), Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International (“FLL”), and 
Tampa International (“TPA”).  Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Taylor, supra note 14; Video clip: Univision Report at 2:15–2:25, Uber y 
Lyft destronan a los taxistas en el aeropuerto de Miami [Uber and Lyft Dethrone Taxi Drivers 
at Miami Airport], UNIVISION COMM., INC.: UNIVISION 23: MIAMI (July 25, 2017, 7:34 PM), 
http://www.univision.com/miami/wltv/uber-y-lyft-destronan-a-los-taxistas-en-el-aeropuerto-
de-miami-video. 
146. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (amended 2014); Auslen et al., supra note 
23. 
147. Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 243; see, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car, 
Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 368–69 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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between such airport or airports and points within such county.”148  Courts 
have ruled that airport authorities may charge different fee amounts to 
different categories of businesses operating in the airport.
149
  The airport 
authority’s justification for the difference in fees is “based upon its rational 
assessment of the relative benefits and the extent of use of each category of 
vehicles that enter the airport.”150  The legitimate purposes supporting the 
different fees could be many—including the regulation and control of airport 
roadway traffic, the protection of the public safety, and the need to generate 
revenue from commercial users of the airport to support the provision of the 
airport facilities to the public—of which only one is needed to uphold the 
regulation.
151
 
In general, the main benefit conferred upon a business operating in 
the airport is the client base of travelers using the airport.
152
  In assessing 
extent of use, courts have considered the volume of vehicles that can be 
accommodated on the airport’s roadways, the number of passengers the 
vehicle can carry, the safety and security costs associated with the increased 
traffic congestion, and designated pickup areas as necessary to accommodate 
the category of users.
153
  Overall, the fees assessed on businesses operating 
within the airport are formulated by a form of benefit-use analysis.
154
  The 
benefits conferred on each business are not always the same, which typically 
gives rise to different fee amounts; in upholding differing fee schedules, the 
Court reasoned: 
 
As the district court found, the on-airport companies 
receive substantial advantages from their presence in the airport, 
including overall customer convenience and access to walk up 
customers, i.e., customers who do not have reservations to rent a 
car from a particular company.  The on-airport companies, 
however, pay negotiated rents for the space they lease in the 
airport terminal and on the airport grounds. Although these rents 
may be below the actual market value of the property, they do 
compensate the Authority for the benefits that the on-airport 
companies receive.
155
 
                                                     
148. FLA. STAT. § 331.15(2) (2016); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 242, 
244. 
149. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 372 (upholding different fee 
schedules for different airport businesses). 
150. Id. at 371. 
151. Id. at 371 n.3–4. 
152. Id. at 373. 
153. Davis v. Miami-Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 
1195 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
154. See id. 
155. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 373. 
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Even though a TNC is “not a common carrier, contract carrier, or 
motor carrier,” eliminating the statutory application provided, the TNC law 
allows airport and seaport authorities to charge reasonable pickup fees.
156
  
The pickup fees must be “consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab 
companies at that airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s 
facilities.”157  In comparing the benefits conferred to TNCs and taxicabs—
one being the “prime curbside real estate when it comes to picking up 
passengers” that taxis and other ground transportation have access to in 
comparison to the designated locations that TNCs are limited to—there are 
substantial advantages to both.
158
  Taxicabs, unlike TNCs—which are 
solicited via smartphone application—rely on street hails or, in the case of 
airport pickups, hails made at the taxicab stand.
159
  But, TNCs do not have to 
wait around in lines to pick up passengers.
160
  Furthermore, taxicabs do not 
pass on the pickup fee to the rider, unlike TNCs; thus, profitability of taxicab 
companies are affected whereas TNCs are not.
161
 
It is presumed, by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s 
text, that the Legislature intended to give airport authorities leeway in setting 
the fee amount because the terms reasonable and consistent with are 
imprecise.
162
  But with the phrase consistent with being used to set the 
relationship between two monetary amounts, of which the baseline number is 
less than $5, it should not result in too big of a difference.
163
  However, when 
                                                     
156. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(2), (15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 3, 
11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748). 
157. Id. § 1(15)(b), at 11.  The preemption exception provided in Florida’s law 
is as follows: 
(b) This subsection does not prohibit an airport or seaport from charging reasonable 
pickup fees consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab companies at that 
airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s facilities or prohibit the 
airport or seaport from designating locations for staging, pickup, and other similar 
operations at the airport or seaport. 
Id. 
158. See Douglas Hanks, Transportation – Uber Getting Special Zone at 
Miami International Airport, MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), May 17, 2016, at 6A; Douglas Hanks, 
Taxis Suing Miami-Dade for $1 Billion over New Uber Law, MIAMI HERALD (May 4, 2016, 
12:41 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article75555187.html [hereinafter Taxis Suing Miami-Dade]. 
159. See Taxis Suing Miami-Dade, supra note 158. 
160. Id. 
161. See Will Robinson, Uber and Lyft Expand Statewide, Thanks to New 
Florida Law, BIZJOURNALS: JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. (July 10, 2017, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2017/07/10/uber-and-lyft-expand-statewide-
thanks-to-new.html. 
162. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 11; 
Auslen et al., supra note 23. 
163. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 
11; Robinson, supra note 161 (explaining the airport rates set across some of Florida’s airports 
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these nominal amounts are applied to the volume of rides currently given, 
and the exponential growth rate of TNC rides at airports, they amount to 
large sums of money.
164
  Ultimately, despite the potential disparity in the 
total amount paid, mandating airports to align the fees charged to TNCs with 
those of taxicabs, fits squarely into the benefits and extent of use formulation 
previously used by the courts.
165
  Furthermore, in setting different regulatory 
frameworks applicable to different users, the airport authorities do not need 
to “achieve perfection or mathematical exactitude,” which is in line with the 
statutory text in Florida’s TNC law.166 
Moreover, the criteria set by Florida’s TNC law on airport pickup 
fees is in accordance with the limited input from the FAA on non-
aeronautical fees.
167
  The FAA, in reference to the self-sustaining 
requirement for receipt of grants, has provided that “[f]air market fees for use 
of the airport are required for non-aeronautical use of the airport.”168  Though 
the FAA guidance is centered more on market fees for rental rates of airport 
facilities, it could be construed to have a general application on airport 
facilities for non-aeronautical use as a whole.
169
  For instance, a TNC law 
expressly requires that the fees charged at airports must be in line with FAA 
regulations.
170
  In general, the self-sustaining assurance tied to FAA grants 
goes hand in hand with airports charging competitive market-based pricing 
for all non-aeronautical fees.
171
  Such fees “can be determined by reference 
to negotiated fees charged for similar uses of the airport,” which is precisely 
the criteria provided in Florida’s TNC law.172 
 
                                                                                                                             
are as follows:  “Miami International Airport currently charges $2, Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport charges $3, Palm Beach International charges $2.50, Tampa 
International Airport charges $3.”). 
164. See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25. 
165. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 
367, 371–72 (11th Cir. 1987). 
166. Id. at 371; see also Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 
Fla. Laws 11. 
167. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 
11; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 5190.6B, FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL: CHAPTER 
17-SELF-SUSTAINABILITY (2009). 
168. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167. 
169. Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999) (explaining that self-sustaining assurance extends to the 
airport receiving fair market value for providing non-aeronautical facilities and services). 
170. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-1710(c)(1) (2016); Policy and Procedures 
Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg. at 7710. 
171. See 49 U.S.C. 47107 (2012); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167. 
172. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167; see also Act effective July 1, 
2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
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V. WHY FLORIDA’S TNC LAW GIVES TNCS A FREE RIDE 
A. Potential Issues:  Oversight 
The TNC driver requirement provision, included in the bi-annual 
research report, is the most important safeguard of the public, because before 
the TNC driver can begin driving, the driver must submit:  an application 
containing basic personal and vehicle information to the TNC, a local and 
national background check is conducted by the TNC or third-party, and a 
driving history research report is obtained and reviewed.
173
  The law 
prohibits TNCs from authorizing a TNC driver to operate if the information 
obtained on the driver through the background check reveals certain 
convictions and driving infractions.
174
  But since the TNC’s compliance with 
the provision would not be confirmed until the bi-annual check, the TNC’s 
non-compliance could expose riders and other drivers to harm, especially 
because the law leaves it up to the TNC or a third-party not specified in the 
law’s text, to conduct the criminal and driving check.175  The foregoing state 
conducted background checks revealed the degree of confidence state 
legislators have in TNCs, which have been shown to be a mistake.
176
  
Furthermore, the law mandates that TNCs retain individual ride records and 
driver records for one year after the date of the ride and for one year after the 
                                                     
173. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11), 2017 Fla. Laws 8; see 
also Adam Vaccaro & Dan Adams, Thousands of Current Uber, Lyft Drivers Fail New 
Background Checks, BOS. GLOBE (Mass.), Apr. 5, 2017, at A1. 
174. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 9.  If 
an initial or subsequent background check of a prospective driver reveals any of the following, 
the TNC may not authorize the driver to operate on the TNC’s platform: 
1. Has been convicted, within the past 5 years, of: 
a. A felony; 
b. A misdemeanor for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, for reckless 
driving, for hit and run, or for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement 
officer; or 
c. A misdemeanor for a violent offense or sexual battery, or a crime of lewdness or 
indecent exposure under chapter 800; 
2. Has been convicted, within the past 3 years, of driving with a suspended or 
revoked license; 
3. Is a match in the National Sex Offender Public Website maintained by the United 
States Department of Justice; 
4. Does not possess a valid driver license; or 
5. Does not possess proof of registration for the motor vehicle used to provide 
prearranged rides. 
Id. 
175. See id. § 1(11)(a)(2), (b) at 8–9 (requiring TNCs to conduct background 
checks for TNC drivers every three years); Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173 (stating that 
Uber conducts criminal background checks on its drivers twice a year). 
176. See Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173. 
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date that a TNC driver’s relationship with the TNC ends, respectively.177  If a 
bi-annual compliance check were to reveal non-compliance regarding driver 
authorization one year after a bi-annual check, relevant ride records or driver 
records—or both—would not, by law, be required to be maintained by the 
TNC.
178
 
B. Lack of Economic Support 
Before Florida enacted its TNC law, most of the local governments 
in the state had put together TNC regulations that allowed the companies to 
operate legally.
179
  Though the local regulations had created “a patchwork of 
local regulations that were in conflict to each other,” the regulations, in 
general, provided the local governments that would be enforcing the 
operation of TNCs with funds to defray the administrative and operational 
oversight required.
180
  Miami-Dade County adopted a TNC license fee of $26 
per vehicle that generated about $1.8 million for the County.
181
  Similarly, 
Hillsborough County came to an agreement with Uber and Lyft to pay 
$250,000 and $125,000 in annual fees, respectively.
182
  However, Florida’s 
TNC law excludes any permit, fee, or license requirements for TNCs to 
operate, except for pickup fees at airports.
183
 
The preemption provision in Florida’s TNC law states that “TNCs, 
TNC drivers, and TNC vehicles are governed exclusively by state law, 
including in any locality or other jurisdiction that enacted a law or created 
rules governing TNCs, TNC drivers, or TNC vehicles before July 1, 2017;” 
essentially eliminating all local regulations, including licensing requirements 
enacted before the law’s effective date.184  The law further prohibits local 
governments from imposing any future economic or administrative 
regulation on TNCs.
185
 
 
                                                     
177. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(14)(a)–(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 
11. 
178. See id. § 1(11)(d), (14)(a)–(b), at 9, 11. 
179. See Auslen et al., supra note 23. 
180. See id.; e.g., Garin Flowers, Hillsborough Reaches Deal with Uber, Lyft, 
WTSP (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/hillsborough-reaches-
deal-with-uber-lyft/350501652. 
181. CHARLES ANDERSON, OFFICE OF COMM’N AUDITOR, BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS MEETING 4 (May 3, 2016, 9:30 AM), 
http//:www.miamidade.gov/auditor/library/2016-05-03-board-of-county-commissioners.pdf; 
Auslen et al., supra note 23. 
182. Flowers, supra note 180. 
183. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. 
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A county, municipality, special district, airport authority, port 
authority, or other local governmental entity or subdivision may 
not: 
1.  Impose a tax on, or require a license for, a TNC, a TNC driver, 
or a TNC vehicle if such tax or license relates to providing 
prearranged rides; 
2.  Subject a TNC, a TNC driver, or a TNC vehicle to any rate, 
entry, operation, or other requirement of the county, municipality, 
special district, airport authority, port authority, or other local 
governmental entity or subdivision; or 
3.  Require a TNC or a TNC driver to obtain a business license or 
any other type of similar authorization to operate within the local 
governmental entity’s jurisdiction.
186
 
 
Florida is not the only state that does not charge TNCs an upfront 
annual cost to operate, but is one of the few among comparable states not 
to.
187
  The decision to not impose any administrative or operational costs on 
TNCs foregoes source funds for local governments that could have been 
allocated to defray costs associated with the significant and increasing 
presence of TNCs across the state.
188
  Like airports, local governments must 
harmonize capital expenditures with available and potential sources of funds, 
but unlike airports, local governments were not afforded the same discretion 
under Florida’s TNC law.189  An analysis provided by the House of 
Representative Staff concluded that as a result of the revenue elimination 
from fees imposed on TNCs by local governments after the law’s 
preemption, local governments “will experience an indeterminate, but likely 
insignificant, negative fiscal impact.”190  The same report concluded that the 
airport preemption exception “may provide a positive fiscal impact to 
                                                     
186. Id. 
187. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–8; BRUCE SCHALLER, 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS:  A BLUEPRINT FOR UBER, LYFT AND TAXI REGULATIONS 3 (2016), 
http://schallerconsult.com/rideservices/blueprint.pdf; Robinson, supra note 161. 
188. See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Tan, supra note 121. 
189. See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Kevin Spear, Orlando Airport Officials 
OK $350 Million Price Hike for New Terminal, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 21, 2017, 4:50 
PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/travel/news/os-airport-terminal-cost-vote-20170621-
story.html.  At Orlando International Airport in Florida, airport officials met and approved a 
$350 million cost increase in the construction of a new terminal; in that same meeting, 
officials set TNC pick up fees at $5.80, which is the highest fee in the United States and 
significantly higher than the $3.30 charged to on-demand taxi services.  Uber, Lyft Pick Up 
Now Allowed at Orlando Airport, CBS MIAMI (June 22, 2017, 2:26 PM), 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2017/06/22/ubert-lyft-pick-up-now-allowed-at-orlando-airport/. 
190. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, HB 221 (2017) Staff 
Analysis 8 (Feb. 14, 2017). 
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airports;” the assertion has proved accurate in 2016, Miami International 
Airport received over $2 million from Uber in pickup fees.
191
 
VI. CONCLUSION
The arrival of TNCs to the Sunshine State has been a blessing for 
some; for others, it has been a lesson in how dynamic, technology-driven 
business can disrupt and cripple an established player in an established 
market.
192
  For local and state lawmakers, it is only one of the many 
regulatory battles to come as technology companies continue to emerge and 
disrupt outdated regulations.
193
  No longer should legislators be reluctant 
adopters of new technologies and businesses in an effort to save the old 
because “[w]ere the old deemed to have a constitutional right to preclude the 
entry of the new into the markets of the old, economic progress might grind 
to a halt.”194 
Whether Florida’s TNC law will be considered an example of a 
successful statewide TNC regulation remains to be seen.
195
  What the law 
provided—much to the satisfaction of the TNCs—was rational insurance 
requirements, parameters on TNC driver authorizations that mirrored those 
the TNCs currently had in effect, minimal administrative and regulatory 
costs, and oversight limited to a bi-annual retroactive compliance check.
196
  
The law is extremely favorable to TNCs, but it ultimately enables thousands 
of Floridians to gain a supplemental income, allows millions to continue 
utilizing their preferred means of transportation, and injects millions of 
dollars into Florida’s airports, but nothing into the municipalities whose 
infrastructures and resources feed the exponential growth of TNCs.
197
 
191. Id. at 9; Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25. 
192. See Douglas Hanks & Rene Rodriguez, For Uber, Loyal Drivers and a 
New Fight for Benefits, MIAMI HERALD (May 21, 2015, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article21599697.html. “Since the company 
launched in Miami-Dade in June 2014, more than 10,000 active driver-partners have taken 
home more than $30 million through more than three million rides the company said this week 
— net which [does not] include above the company’s commission, typically less than [twenty] 
percent.”  Id.; see also Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:08–2:47. 
193. See Ducassi, supra note 26. 
194. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Miadeco Corp. v. 
Miami-Dade Cty. No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017) (quoting Ill. Transp. Trade 
Ass’n v. City of Chi., 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016). 
195. See SCHALLER, supra note 187, at 18. 
196. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)–(9), (11)(e) 2017 Fla. 
Laws 4–8; Robinson, supra 161. 
197. See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:20–3:29; Ducassi, 
supra note 26. 
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